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INTRODUCTION
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice, LLC (“Heartwood”) is seeking review of the
district court’s decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions based on its determination that
Heartwood should have withdrawn its complaint after discovery and not opposed the
defendants’ summary judgment motion. As support for its appeal, Heartwood devoted a
great deal of its opening brief to detailing all of the facts it relied on as support for both its
complaint and its opposition to summary judgment. For example, Heartwood went into
great detail outlining all of the meetings between Ms. Huber and other Heartwood
employees after Ms. Huber left Heartwood to work for Good Shepherd Home Care &
Hospice (“Good Shepherd”), as well as all of the evidence showing that Ms. Molyneux had
contacted Heartwood’s patients in order to have them transfer to Good Shepherd. Based
on these facts, Heartwood contends that the district court erred when it imposed Rule 11
sanctions.
In response, defendants Glenna Molyneux and Rita Huber do not even address
whether the foregoing facts justified Heartwood’s decision not to withdraw its complaint.
In other words, the defendants made no argument whatsoever as to why they believe these
facts did not provide an objectively reasonable basis for Heartwood’s decision to pursue
its complaint and oppose their summary judgment motion. Rather, the defendants only
present procedural arguments as to whether Rule 11 imposes an ongoing duty to review
previously submitted filings and whether the district court was entitled to impose Rule 11
sanctions based on an opposition to summary judgment. Since no effort was made to
4

address the substantive evidence presented by Heartwood as support for its decision to file
the complaint and oppose summary judgment, this Court must reverse the district court’s
decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions.
Heartwood is also appealing the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment
and dismiss Heartwood’s contract and tort claims. Defendants argue that summary
judgment was appropriate because Heartwood failed to present sufficient facts in its Rule
30(b)(6) deposition to support all its claims. However, defendants again fail to address the
other testimony and evidence which Heartwood presented as support for its claims. Such
evidence was sufficient for purposes of summary judgment. Therefore, the district court’s
decision to dismiss Heartwood’s claims must be reversed.
RESPONSE TO APPELLEES’ STATEMENT OF FACTS
In their opening statement of facts, defendants contend that when Heartwood’s
owner, Lee Vasic, was asked in his deposition to identify facts supporting the allegations
in Heartwood’s complaint, “Vasic responded that there were no facts supporting the
allegations or that the allegations were just assumptions.” (Appellee Brief at 8). This is
simply untrue. As will be shown more fully below, Mr. Vasic typically responded to
counsel’s deposition questions by identifying circumstantial evidence which he believed
supported the allegations in the complaint. Upon further questioning, Mr. Vasic would
then state that he personally had no first-hand knowledge, i.e., direct evidence, to support
the allegations. This is significantly different than saying he had “no facts” as defendants
allege.
5

In order to demonstrate the foregoing, Heartwood will set forth relevant allegations
from the defendants’ summary judgment motion in which defendants claimed that
Heartwood had “no facts” to support particular allegations in its complaint. These will
then be followed by the actual deposition testimony upon which each of the defendants’
allegations is purportedly based:
Statement of Fact No. 6
Heartwood has no facts to support the allegation that Rita Huber recruited
Merrill Nielsen to work for Good Shephard [sic]. Compare Complaint at
¶17. (Vasic Depo. 71:-72:20).
(R. at 441)
Relevant testimony
Q.
So what facts do you have that Ms. Huber contacted Mr. Nielson and
persuaded him to leave Heartwood?
A.
He was going to lunch with her after she had quit Heartwood, and it
seemed like he did that for a couple of weeks in a row. And then I’m not
even sure we knew at the time she was working for Good Shepherd. And
then, all of a sudden, he – we found out she was working at Good Shepherd;
and then, all of a sudden, he quit and went to Good Shepherd. So, you know,
our understanding was that’s probably why he went to Good Shepherd.
Q.
Okay. You say “understanding.” Do you mean assumption?
A.
Assumption, yeah.
Q.
Okay. So you have no fact—
A.
I have no facts on that.
(R. at 340).
Statement of Fact No. 8
Heartwood has no facts to support the allegation that Rita Huber persuaded
Glenna Molyneaux [sic] to move to Good Shephard [sic]. Compare Complaint at
¶20. (Vasic Depo. 79:1-4).
6

(R. at 442).
Relevant testimony
Q.
“Based on information and belief, Ms. Molyneux left Heartwood after
she was contacted directly by Ms. Huber and Mr. Nielson and persuaded to
do so.”
A.
Yes.
Q.
Again, I’d like to know what facts you have to support that statement.
A.
Glenna told me that’s why she was – in fact, that’s – that might have
been where we thought Mr. Nielson was the DON [Director of Nursing],
because Glenna told me she was going to go to Good Shepherd and that –
Mr. Nielson was there.
Q.
And did she say that Mr. Nielson persuaded her to go?
A.
Not-not in so many words, just that he went there. She was sad that
he was gone. And she was fasting and praying where she should go, and then
all of a sudden, she decided to go to Good Shepherd.
Q.
Okay. Is there evidence that Ms. Huber persuaded Glenna to go to
Good Shepherd?
A.
I think she mentioned that Rita was over there also.
(R. at 342).
Statement of Fact No. 9
Heartwood has no facts to support the allegation that Good Shephard [sic]
made an agreement with Glenna Molyneaux [sic] to get patients from
Heartwood. Compare Complaint at ¶ 20. (Vasic Depo. 79:11-80:9)
(R. at 442).
Relevant testimony
Q.
Okay. Paragraph 21: "Based on information and belief, Good
Shepherd hired Ms. Molyneux in exchange for Ms. Molyneux's agreement
to contact Heartwood's employees and try to persuade them to begin working
for Good Shepherd." What evidence do you have, or facts, to support the-that there was an agreement between Ms. Molyneux and Good Shepherd to
contact Heartwood's employees?
A.
Just her passion for trying to get people to go to Good Shepherd.
Q.
Glenna's passion?
7

A.
Yeah. Suddenly, Good Shepherd was the best thing since sliced
bread. So--and so, of course, we think: Why is she trying so hard to get
everyone to go over there, you know?
Q.
Uh-huh (Affirmative).
A
So, I mean, it was a--it was probably a conclusion we made: They
must be giving her some kind of a bonus or something to get these patients
and all these employees to go over there.
Q.
Now, she testified that she got no recruiting bonuses, and Good
Shepherd testified that they gave no recruiting bonuses to any of them. What-are there any facts to support that she-A.
There are no facts.
Q.
Just the assumption?
A.
Just the assumption, and her--and how hard she fought to--I mean,
she--for example, the person that replaced her was going to see a patient on
the first morning that she had worked for Good Shepherd, and Glenna called
that CNA and said, "You don't need to come here. This person's coming to
Good Shepherd." And when that CNA got to the patient's house, Merrill and
Glenna were there and the CNA walked in. And the patient said, "I don't want
to go with Good Shepherd. These guys are telling me I have to."
Q.
That's what the patient said?
A.
Yeah. And then Glenna said, "No, we're just saying our good-byes.
We just want to come and say good-bye," you know, and--so yeah, our
conclusion is: Man, they're sure fighting hard to get these patients. There
must be some kind of compensation going on here, because that's the first
day--I think that was the first day she worked for Good Shepherd she's at one
of my patient's homes first thing in the morning, calling my staff, telling them
"Don't come."
(R. at 342-43).
Statement of Fact No. 12
Heartwood doesn’t know what, if anything, Rita Huber or Glenna Molyneaux
[sic]that was false or disparaging but he knows Merrill Nielsen said
demeaning things about Heartwood. Compare Complaint at ¶23. (Vasic
Depo. 87:20-90:3).
(R. at 442).
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Relevant testimony
Q.
Okay. So to your--to your personal knowledge, you don't know that
Ms. Huber made any false statements about Heartwood?
A.
I know she made some statements; I just don't know what they are. I
don't have a recollection. But the person she made the statement to knows.
Q
I--and that's why I'm asking--the way I formulated the question was,
to your personal-A
Right.
Q
--knowledge, meaning what you know from seeing, hearing-A.
Right.
Q
--do you know that she made any--Rita Huber made any false
statements about Heartwood?
A.
Well, I want to answer this by saying I know she did. I just don't know
what they were. So I guess I can't say I know. I just know Scott said she did.
But I don't know what they were.
Q.
Okay. So any knowledge you have would be based on what Scott told
you; is that-A
Yes.
Q
--accurate?
A
Yes.
Q
Okay. And then the same question with Ms.—with respect to Ms.
Molyneux.
A
I don't--I don't remember at this point who she talked to or what she
said.
(R. at 344-45).
Statement of Fact No. 14
Heartwood has no facts to support the allegation that Rita Huber said
demeaning things. Compare Complaint at ¶23. (Vasic Depo. 93:17).
(R. at 442).
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Relevant testimony
Q
Okay. And do you have any personal knowledge that Rita Huber
misinformed Heartwood's patients?
A
No.
(R. at 346). In this instance, the testimony cited by defendants shows that Mr. Vasic
was not asked whether Ms. Huber had ever stated “demeaning things.” Moreover,
Heartwood is not claiming that Ms. Huber contacted Heartwood patients. Rather,
it is claiming that she contacted Heartwood employees
Statement of Fact No. 15
Heartwood has no facts to support the allegation that Glenna Molyneaux
demeaned them other than when she was sitting next to Merrill Nielsen who
was speaking. Compare Complaint at ¶23. (Vasic Depo. 93:22)
(R. at 442).
Relevant testimony
Q.
“[T]he last sentence says, "In doing so, the individual defendants have
knowingly and intentionally misinformed Heartwood's patients concerning
the terms of their contracts to induce them to terminate their contracts with
Heartwood." I just wanted to ask, which defendants have knowingly and
intentionally misinformed Heartwood's patients concerning the terms of their
contracts?
A.
Mr. Nielson and Glenna.
Q
And what was the misinformation they stated?
A
They also said that Heartwood was going bankrupt and unethical and
that Medicare wouldn't continue to pay for their service if they stayed with
Heartwood.
Q
Glenna said that?
A
To my knowledge, Glenna was in--was sitting next to Mr. Nielson
when he said that.
Q
And who did he say that to?
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A
He said that to a patient. I can't remember—I think I have a patient
statement saying that. And I have—I have Maria saying she heard them
saying that as well.
(R. at 345-46).
Statement of Fact Nos. 16 and 23
Glenna Molyneaux [sic] didn’t recruit patients before she left though Julie
Widner might have. Compare Complaint at ¶15, 18. (Vasic Depo. 106:1524).
(R. at 443).
Relevant testimony
Q.
And any of this alleged recruiting occur after my clients had left your
employ?
A.
Well, while Glenna was working there her last week, we started
getting faxes. And when we called the patients and said, "Why are you
leaving?" they go, "Because we hear Glenna's leaving." And later we found
out that Julie Widener was going out in some cases and telling the patients,
"Glenna's leaving. You need to come over to Good Shepherd." So recruiting-yeah, recruiting was happening right at that last week.
(R. at 349).
Statement of Fact No. 18
Heartwood has no facts to support the allegation that Good Shephard [sic]
instructed the Defendants to make improper statements to patients. Compare
Complaint at ¶23. (Vasic Depo. 101:2-5)
(R. at 443).
Relevant testimony
Q.
Do you know whether Good Shepherd ever instructed either of the
three individual defendants to make any of those statements to the patients?
A.
I do not.
11

(R. at 348). In this instance, the defendant’s statement of fact was inaccurate and
misleading. Contrary to the allegation, Heartwood’s complaint does not allege that
Good Shepherd ever instructed the defendants to make any improper statements to
patients (R. at 18). This was simply a question which Mr. Vasic was asked in his
deposition.
Statement of Fact No. 19
Heartwood has no facts to support the allegation that Good Shephard
instructed Defendants to make statements to employees. Compare
Complaint at ¶23. (Vasic Depo. 101:12-19)
(R. at 443).
Relevant testimony
Q
And do you have any facts, personal information to establish that
Good Shepherd instructed or asked the individual defendants to make
statements to the other employees … meaning Heartwood’s employees….
A.
I do not.
(R. at 348). Again, the defendant’s statement of fact was inaccurate and misleading.
Contrary to the allegation, Heartwood’s complaint does not allege that Good
Shepherd ever instructed the defendants to make any improper statements to
Heartwood’s employees. (R. at 18). This was simply a question which Mr. Vasic
was asked in his deposition.
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ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS CONCEDE THAT SANCTIONS WERE BASED ON
HEARTWOOD’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION, A DOCUMENT WHICH DEFENDANTS NEVER
CHALLENGED PURSUANT TO RULE 11.
At the time defendants filed their Rule 11 motion, they were clearly challenging the

sufficiency of Heartwood’s complaint as of the time it was filed. In fact, the motion itself
expressly alleged that “the Plaintiff commenced this action without factual or legal basis
for said claims.” (R. at 555) (emphasis added).
Despite their initial challenge to the complaint itself, defendants now concede that
the district court’s sanctions were not based on any findings that Heartwood violated Rule
11 when it presented its complaint for filing. See Appellees’ Brief at 16. (“[T]he trial court
did not base its decision on the fact that the content of the complaint was wrong when the
complaint was filed.”). Rather, defendants openly admit that Heartwood was sanctioned
for its decision to oppose the defendants’ summary judgment motion. For example, they
state that Rule 11 applies to this case because “Heartwood’s response to the motion for
summary judgment was by way of other papers which were signed asserting the legal and
factual substance of Heartwood’s position under Rule 11.” Id.
Despite defendants’ arguments, there is nothing in the language of Rule 11 that
subjects a plaintiff to sanctions for any papers they may file after a defendant challenges
the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to Rule 11. Rather, the rule expressly states that it
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only looks to whether an attorney has satisfied certain obligations when “presenting” a
pleading to the court. Utah R.Civ. P. 11(b).
There is language in Rule 11 which states that the presentation of a pleading includes
“advocating” a pleading. Id. Defendants seize this language to argue that Heartwood was
advocating its complaint when it opposed defendants’ summary judgment motion and
therefore the opposition violated Rule 11. However, defendants served their Rule 11
Motion on October 15, 2013. (R. at 440). This was approximately three weeks before
defendants filed their summary judgment motion (R. at 297) and almost two months before
Heartwood filed its opposition to summary judgment. (R. at 472). It is unclear how a
motion for sanctions can be directed towards an opposition memorandum that was not even
drafted when the motion for sanctions was served.
If defendants believed that the Heartwood’s opposition to their summary judgment
motion lacked sufficient evidentiary support so as to violate Rule 11, they should have filed
a Rule 11 motion that attacked the opposition memorandum itself. They chose not to do
so. As such, the district court was not entitled to look at Heartwood’s opposition to
summary judgment as a basis for awarding sanctions for the purported insufficiency of
Heartwood’s complaint.
Defendants attempt to justify the district court’s decision by arguing that Heartwood
had an ongoing duty to review the sufficiency of its complaint as the case progressed.
However, as Heartwood demonstrated in its opening brief, a plaintiff is not subject to
sanctions for the filing of its complaint simply because the complaint is subsequently
14

dismissed at a later time. See, e.g., Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 595 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A
complaint does not merit sanctions under Rule 11 simply because it merits dismissal
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)”); Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Dignity Viatical Settlement
Partners, LP, 171 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The mere fact that a claim ultimately proves
unavailing, without more, cannot support the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.”); Teamsters
Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 66, 69 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Rule 11
may not be invoked because an attorney, after time for discovery, is unable to produce
adequate evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”). The fact is that
defendants have failed to cite a single case where a plaintiff was subjected to Rule 11
sanctions for filing their complaint simply because a court subsequently granted summary
judgment against the plaintiff.
Defendants also claim that the Tenth Circuit has used Rule 11 to impose a
continuing duty on lawyers to review the sufficiency of their pleadings. This is not true.
As Heartwood pointed out in its opening brief, the Tenth Circuit does not place a continuing
obligation on parties and their attorneys to review the sufficiency of their pleadings. See
Griffen v. City of Oklahoma City, 3 F.3d 336, 339 (10th Cir. 1993) (Rule 11 does not
impose a continuing obligation on the signer to update previously filed pleadings). The
cases which defendants cite do not change this holding whatsoever. For example, in
Automobile Assurance Financial Corp. v. Syrett Corp., 107 F.3d 20 (10th Cir. 1997), the
Court never once discussed an ongoing duty under Rule 11. Rather, the decision upheld
sanctions against an attorney who “failed to conduct an adequate inquiry before filing his
15

pleadings ….” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Findlay v. Banks, 87 F.3d 1146 (10th
Cir. 1996), the Court never discussed a party’s ongoing duty to review a complaint. Rather,
the Court sanctioned a lawyer who had filed a memorandum with the bankruptcy court in
which he improperly omitted important language from a statute. Id. at 1148-49. In other
words, neither of these cases support the proposition for which defendants cite them, and
they certainly do not reverse the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Griffen.
In sum, a party is not subject to Rule 11 sanctions for filing a complaint simply
because it was later unable to produce facts sufficient to withstand a summary judgment
motion. This is because the standard for summary judgment is very different than the one
used for Rule 11 purposes. Unlike summary judgment, the focus in a Rule 11 motion is
not on the admissible evidence that a party can produce at trial. Rather, the focus is on the
reasonableness of the investigation that took place prior to the complaint being filed.
In this case, Heartwood has demonstrated that it conducted a reasonable
investigation before it submitted its complaint in this matter. Furthermore, it has produced
substantial circumstantial evidence which strongly suggests that the defendants did, in fact,
commit the acts alleged in the complaint. As such, Heartwood’s decision to file its
complaint was entirely reasonable. It certainly does not give rise to the type of “exceptional
circumstances” to which Rule 11 is intended to apply. Therefore, the Rule 11 sanctions
imposed against Heartwood were not justified, and the district court’s ruling must be
reversed.

16

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANTS’ FAVOR.
A.

Defendants Grossly Mischaracterize Mr. Vasic’s Deposition Testimony.

As part of their Brief, the defendants argue that Heartwood’s owner, Lee Vasic,
consistently testified in his deposition that Heartwood had “no evidence to support the
operative paragraphs of its complaint.”

(Appellee’s Brief at 18).

They go on to

mischaracterize his testimony as “no facts” testimony. However, as shown more fully
above, this is simply untrue. In fact, the defendants make no attempt to list the requisite
elements for each of Heartwood’s claims or show the specific portion of Mr. Vasic’s
deposition where he purportedly admitted that he had no facts with which to satisfy each
element. Rather, defendants simply make unsupported and conclusory allegations that Mr.
Vasic was unprepared and unable to support Heartwood’s case.
The fact is that Mr. Vasic did provide testimony about the facts which he believed
supported the allegations in his complaint. For example, when asked what facts he had to
support Heartwood’s allegation that Ms. Huber had been recruiting Heartwood employees
to come to work at Good Shepherd, Mr. Vasic testified about the facts that one of
Heartwood’s long-time employees suddenly quit and began working for Good Shepherd
after having a several lunches with Ms. Huber. (R. at 340). Similarly, when asked what
facts Heartwood had to support its allegations that Ms. Molyneux had attempted to get
Heartwood patients to switch their care to Good Shepherd, Mr. Vasic testified that Ms.
Molyneux had visited her former Heartwood patients while working for Good Shepherd
17

and had told the patient’s CNA that the patient was going to transfer their care. (R. at 34243). While such evidence may be circumstantial, it undoubtedly contradicts defendants’
assertion that Mr. Vasic said he had “no facts” to support Heartwood’s claims.
Moreover, defendants’ arguments completely ignore all the other admissible
evidence which Heartwood submitted as support for its claims and which defendants made
no attempt to dispute. For example, defendants do not address the evidence of meetings
with Heartwood employees during which Ms. Huber would discuss employment
opportunities at Good Shepherd and the employees’ current dissatisfaction with
Heartwood. (R. at 466-67). Nor do they address the fact that two of the employees with
whom Ms. Huber met quit Heartwood and began working for Good Shepherd. (Id.) The
fact that two of Ms. Huber’s former co-workers followed her to Good Shepherd within two
months of Ms. Huber’s departure from Heartwood, when coupled with Ms. Huber’s
admission that she discussed job openings at Good Shepherd with these same two
employees, undoubtedly creates a strong inference that Ms. Huber contacted these former
co-workers in violation of her contract and persuaded them to leave Heartwood and begin
working for a competitor.
Defendants also do not address the fact that six of Heartwood’s patients who had
received care from Molyneux at Heartwood transferred their care to Good Shepherd within
days after Ms. Molyneux’s departure. (R. at 476). They also ignore the fact that four of
these six patients completed “Start of Care Worksheets” for Good Shepherd which
identified “Glenna Molyneux” as the person who referred them to Good Shepherd. These
18

worksheet entries, when combined with the timing of the patients’ transfers to Good
Shepherd, create a compelling inference that Ms. Molyneux contacted the patients to
persuade them to transfer their care to Good Shepherd.
Based on the foregoing, it is insincere for defendants to claim that Heartwood
somehow admitted that it had “no facts” to support its claims. Mr. Vasic identified specific
circumstantial evidence which he believed supported Heartwood’s allegations. Heartwood
also produced testimony and evidence from other parties which supported its claims that
defendants interfered with Heartwood’s employment and patient relationships. Therefore,
Heartwood respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment in defendants’ favor.
B.

The Sham Affidavit Doctrine Has No Application to Heartwood’s
Opposition to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion.

As stated more fully above, defendants make no attempt to address or dispute the
deposition testimony and exhibits which Heartwood submitted in opposition to defendants’
summary judgment motion. Instead, defendants seek to exclude such evidence pursuant to
the “sham affidavit” doctrine. However, this doctrine has no application because neither
Heartwood nor its representatives ever submitted an affidavit in opposition to defendants’
summary judgment motion. Rather, Heartwood relied entirely on the parties’ deposition
testimony, as well as documents produced by the parties during discovery.
In explaining the sham affidavit doctrine, Utah courts have stated that “when a party
takes a clear position in a deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may
19

not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition,
unless he can provide an explanation of the discrepancy.” Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170,
1172-73 (Utah 1983). In this case, neither Heartwood nor Mr. Vasic ever submitted an
affidavit to the court that contradicted Mr. Vasic’s Rule 30(b)(6) testimony. In fact,
Heartwood did not submit any affidavits in opposition to the defendants’ summary
judgment motion. Rather, Heartwood’s opposition was based entirely on the pleadings,
the defendants’ depositions and documents which were produced by the parties during
discovery.

(R. at 473-79). Therefore, since Heartwood never submitted any affidavits

which contradicted its deposition testimony, the sham affidavit doctrine has no application
to this case.
Defendants also claim that this Court previously held in Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v.
Hardy that the sham affidavit doctrine applies to any affidavit submitted on a party’s
behalf, as opposed to just a party’s personal affidavit. See 2005 UT 92, 110 P.3d 168.
However, defendants misstate this Court’s decision.

In Hardy, this Court actually

disagreed with the district court’s decision to exclude an affidavit submitted by the
defendant pursuant to the sham affidavit doctrine. See id. at ¶ 14, fn1. Moreover, the
affidavit at issue was not submitted by a third-party on the defendant’s behalf. Rather, it
was the defendant’s own affidavit in which he attempted to explain what he understood a
contractual provision to mean. Id. at ¶ 14. Therefore, this Court did not expand the sham
affidavit doctrine as defendants represented in their brief.
Finally, other than conclusory statements, defendants fail to explain how the
20

evidence which Heartwood submitted in opposition to summary judgment contradicted Mr.
Vasic’s deposition testimony. For example, Mr. Vasic never denied that (1) Ms. Huber
met certain Heartwood employees for lunch shortly before they quit Heartwood and started
working for Good Shepherd, (2) Ms. Huber discussed job opportunities at Good Shepherd
with these employees, (3) six patients which Ms. Molyneux treated at Heartwood
transferred their care to Good Shepherd within days of Ms. Molyneux starting work at
Good Shepherd, and (4) four of the six patients who transferred their care to Good Shepherd
filled out forms listing Ms. Molyneux as the person who referred them to Good Shepherd.
Therefore, even if the sham affidavit doctrine did apply to evidence other than personal
affidavits (which it does not), the doctrine would still not apply to this case.
C.

Defendants’ Non-Solicitation Agreements Do Not Preclude Defendants
from Competing with Heartwood.

As support for their summary judgment motion, defendants reiterate the district
court’s determination that the defendants’ confidentiality agreements are unenforceable
because they constitute an unlawful restraint of trade. Heartwood addressed the district
court’s ruling in its opening brief and will not reiterate its arguments herein.

See

Appellant’s Opening Brief at 53-55.
In addition, and like the district court’s ruling, the defendants’ arguments are all
premised on an assumption that the relevant employment agreements preclude defendants
from competing with Heartwood and/or place restrictions on the defendants’ future
employment. This is not true. There is nothing in these agreements that places limits on
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where or by whom defendants may be employed after they leave Heartwood. Rather, the
agreements simply preclude the defendants from soliciting Heartwood’s employees and
patients. As such, the case law which defendants cite has no application to the defendants’
contracts, because all the cited cases deal with non-competition agreements. The fact is
that neither the defendants nor the district court cited a single case in which a Utah court
has invalidated a non-solicitation agreement for the reasons stated in the district court’s
ruling. Therefore, the district court’s decision to invalidate the parties’ agreement as an
unlawful restraint of trade must be reversed.
D.

The Exclusive Remedy Clause Which Defendants Cite Has a Limited
Scope and Does Not Apply to the Present Dispute.

Defendants also argue that summary judgment is appropriate because the
defendants’ confidentiality/non-disclosure agreements purportedly contain an exclusive
remedy provision which lists termination and discipline as the only remedies available to
Heartwood. However, it must be emphasized that defendants never actually quote or set
forth the relevant provision in their brief. This is not surprising, as the relevant provision
has no application to the present dispute.
The provision in the defendants’ contracts which contains the relevant exclusive
remedy provision states as follows:
Caring for current or past Heartwood Home Health and Hospice patients on
a private duty basis outside of your employment with HEARTWOOD
HOME HEALTH & HOSPICE is strictly prohibited and will be grounds for
immediate termination.
(R. at 493). In other words, the exclusive remedy provision cited by the defendants does
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not apply to any breach of the agreement. It only applies to instances where an employee
of Heartwood treats Heartwood patients on a private-duty basis.
In this case, Heartwood does not claim that Mss. Molyneux or Huber cared for any
Heartwood patients on a private-duty basis while still working for Heartwood. Therefore,
the exclusive remedy provision they cite has no application. Therefore, this court must
reject defendants’ argument that the contract does not support Heartwood’s claims.
E.

The Defendants’ Duty of Confidentiality Extended Beyond Their
Employment with Heartwood.

Defendants argue that “Utah case law is clear that an employee’s fiduciary duty ends
at the termination of employment….” (Appellee Brief at 22). In doing so, defendants cite
the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26,
94 P.3d 179. However, defendants do not quote any specific language from the decision;
nor do they cite a specific paragraph. Therefore, it is unclear which portion of the decision
the defendants are relying on for their legal conclusion.
Moreover, the Young decision did not include a general discussion of fiduciary
duties. Rather, it was dealing exclusively with the duty of loyalty. 2004 UT 26 at ¶ 19.
Heartwood concedes that the duty of loyalty ends with employment, which is why it
expressly states in its opening brief that its claim for breach of the duty of loyalty is only
being made against Ms. Molyneux for efforts she made to recruit patients to Good
Shepherd while she still worked for Heartwood. (Appellant’s Opening Brief at 57).
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However, Heartwood has also stated claims against the defendants for breaching
their duties of confidentiality. As discussed more fully in Heartwood’s previous brief, this
duty does extend beyond the termination of one’s employment. See Envirotech Corp. v.
Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 496 (Utah App. 1994) (“[a] former employee may not use
confidential information obtained during the course of his or her employment to compete
after termination with his or her former employer.”) Therefore, Heartwood’s fiduciary
duty claims are not barred by the fact that some of the defendants’ conduct occurred after
their employment with Heartwood ended.
III.

DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES ON
APPEAL.
Finally, defendants have requested an award of attorneys’ fees on appeal. In doing

so, defendants rely on a series of cases which have held that a party who is awarded attorney
fees by the trial court as a “prevailing party” is also entitled to attorney fees on appeal. See
K.F.K. v. T.W., 2005 UT App 85, ¶¶ 2, 7, 110 P.3d 162 (attorney fees awarded where party
had prevailed in opposing a Rule 11 motion); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319
(Utah 1998) (Attorney fees awarded to the “prevailing party” pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56); Utah Dep’t of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App.
1991) (Attorney fees awarded to the “prevailing party” pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7827-56).
In this case, the defendants were not awarded attorney’s fees because they were the
“prevailing parties.”

Rather, the fees were awarded as a form of sanction against
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Heartwood pursuant to Rule 11. As such, the purpose of the sanctions was not to
compensate the defendants for their fees. Rather, the purpose of the sanctions was “to deter
repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Utah
R.Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Defendants have not cited any case law which allows this Court to
impose additional sanctions automatically under Rule 11 based solely on a sanctioned
party’s decision to appeal. Rather, they would have to show that the papers which
Heartwood filed on appeal were themselves filed in violation of Rule 11. No such
argument has been made by the defendants.
Finally, it must be emphasized that this dispute regarding Rule 11 sanctions arose
because Heartwood and the district court had differing views over the strength of the
evidence Heartwood used to support its claims. Heartwood believed it had strong
circumstantial evidence, while the district court believed such evidence constituted
speculation. This Court has recognized the difficulty that arises when trying to draw a line
between these two concepts. See State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ¶ 16, 3 P.3d 725.
(Recognizing that the difference between drawing a reasonable inference and merely
speculating about possibilities is “sometimes subtle.”). Therefore, it is certainly not
improper or frivolous for Heartwood to ask this Court to review the district court’s findings
on this issue.
Based on the foregoing, Heartwood respectfully requests that this Court deny the
defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees.
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